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In the study of African Politics, the analysis of political ideologies as a normative engine of political 
action seems to have receded in favour of a treatment of ideology as the support of actors in their 
pursuit of material interests. Rwanda is not an exception. The ideology of the ruling Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) has been predominantly analysed as a self-serving strategy geared towards the 
reinforcement of the party’s power. Such treatment of ideology prevents a full understanding of the 
RPF. This article argues that ideology should also be conceptualized as a matrix that can reshape 
material incentives and through which the RPF’s interests have emerged. To do so, the article 
analyses new sources of material, the songs of mobilization from RPF members and supporters 
composed before the Front took power during the genocide, to systematically delineate the RPF’s 
early ideology. The analysis centres on four main themes – Rwandan national unity, the RPF’s 
depiction of itself, its depiction of its enemy, and its relationship with the international community – 
and traces their influence on RPF interests in the post-genocide era. It reveals the surprisingly long-
lasting power of ideas despite fast-changing material circumstances. 
 
 
THE STUDY OF AFRICAN POLITICS HAS LONG focussed on the material. This trend can be 
traced to the double influence since the late 1970s of the rational choice paradigm and of the 
neopatrimonialism school in African political analysis.1 The former considers politics as the 
product of self-interested, rational individuals. The latter explains politics mainly by the 
tendency of politicians to blur the public/private dichotomy in order to better serve their 
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interests and the ones of their family, ethnic group, or clients. Although a literature, often 
from anthropology, highlights the role of ideas, especially neoliberal ones, in influencing 
politics and institutions, structural explanations appear prevalent in the study of African 
political behaviours. Unlike during the two decades after decolonization,2 the analysis of 
political ideologies as a normative engine of political action seems to have receded in favour 
of a treatment of ideology as the support of actors in their pursuit of material interests.3 
Post-genocide Rwanda is not an exception. It is widely recognized that the ideology 
of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has played a significant role in shaping 
Rwanda’s trajectory since 1994.4 Yet, the RPF ideological stance has predominantly been 
analysed as self-serving and geared towards the reinforcement of the ruling party’s power. 
The literature does not ignore the potency of ideas within the RPF or their unintended 
consequences in post-genocide Rwanda, but it typically explores ideas as a result of interests: 
the instrument to manufacture consent and manipulate external audiences, whether domestic 
or international. Andrea Purdeková for example considers that the RPF ideological discourse 
on unity serves as ‘a powerful legitimization of rule’ and ‘a chip to gain foreign support’,5 
while Filip Reyntjens argues that it ‘served above all to hide ethnocracy’.6 Susan Thomson 
analyses the RPF ideological discourse on history as ‘strategically revisionist’, ‘a product of 
the RPF elite designed to safeguard their own positions of power’, and used ‘to maintain 
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control of Rwanda’s political and social landscape.’7 Overall, there is a consensus that ‘the 
regime has used ideology as a tool to deflect domestic and international criticism and control 
the population, in other words, as a means to maintain power.’8  
The aim of this article is twofold. First, the article demonstrates that such treatment of 
ideology prevents a full understanding of the RPF’s behaviour. Rather than only considering 
ideology as the instrument to advance the RPF’s interests, the article argues that ideology 
should also be conceptualized as a matrix that can reshape material incentives and through 
which the RPF’s interests have emerged. To this end, the second contribution of the article is 
to provide an analysis of RPF ideology based on new sources. Despite the importance of 
ideology in post-genocide politics, systematic analyses of the RPF’s ideology remain scarce. 
The works directly concerned with the RPF’s ideology have analysed it from a particular 
angle. Philip Roessler and Harry Verhoeven have addressed pan-Africanist and anti-neo 
colonial aspects of the RPF through their wider analysis of the ideology of liberation politics 
in Africa.9 Purdeková has focussed on the idea of unity in post-genocide Rwanda.10 Other 
works have reflected about the influence of the RPF “high-modernist” ideas in the post-1994 
development policies.11 Overall, with the exception of an article by Reyntjens, ‘specific 
themes have been addressed, often implicitly but not in an overall fashion.’12 In addition, 
these analyses, including Reyntjens’, are based on post-1994 interviews, declarations and 
documents, when the RPF was already a successful rebellion-turned-ruling party that could 
potentially alter its original ideological stance to serve the new imperatives of power. This is 
unsurprising as RPF’s early ideological statements are extremely rare, probably due to the 
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clandestine nature of the RPF, its sociological composition of young, and not always 
educated, soldiers, and the general preference in Rwandan culture for orality. Reyntjens thus 
notes that, among all the pre-genocide RPF statements and radio broadcasts he reviewed, 
none contain significant ideological substance.13 Only the RPF’s minimalist eight points 
political programme circulated in 1990 included some broad ideological references to 
national unity, democracy and a self-reliant nation.14 Consequently, missing from the analysis 
is a systematic empirical study of the original RPF ideological discourse. This article fills this 
gap by analysing songs of RPF members and supporters that were composed before or 
around the RPF victory (1988-1995). This ensures that the ideology identified is genuinely 
reflective of ideological thinking at the time and not reconstructed ex-post. The songs’ 
primary audience were not foreigners, donors, NGOs or the Rwandan population. Rather, 
they had a function of diffusing an ideology within the movement itself for mobilization and 
education, and can, as a result, hardly be considered as a manipulative tool for an external 
audience. Through analysis of pre-genocide songs, the article reveals the surprisingly long-
lasting power of ideas despite changing material circumstances. 
The article is organized in three sections. The first discusses the concepts of ideology 
and interests. It then presents the research methodology. The second section contains an 
analysis of different ideological themes in songs and their implications for post-genocide 
governance. The last section reflects on the contribution of the article to the understanding of 
Rwandan and African politics in general. It demonstrates the value of adopting a 
constructivist perspective in interpreting the RPF’s interests after 1994 and reasserts the 
importance of ideology as a key driver of political behaviour in Africa.  
 
Ideas, interests, and songs 
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Ideology can be understood as ideas constituting ‘the shared framework of mental models 
that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and 
a prescription as to how that environment should be structured.’15 Based on this definition, 
this articles explores ideology by focusing on three aspects: a cognitive dimension, about 
how the world is interpreted; a normative dimension, specifying how the world should be; 
and an instrumental one, specifying the means to attain such an ideal. 
The importance of ideas, and notably ideology,16 in explaining human behaviours has 
been increasingly recognized over the last twenty years in social science and has rekindled 
the debate about whether “interests” or “ideas” drive human agency.17 This ‘ideational turn’18 
has been a reaction to rational-choice approaches that have considered ideas as the mere 
reflection of underlying, objective, material interests (money, power, utility) that exist 
independently from actors’ beliefs.19 Ideas in this perspective are either the medium through 
which actors discover their “true” interests or weapons in the pursuit of such interests. In 
contrast, the ideational approach to politics emphasizes that interests do not emerge in a 
direct manner from the material world. They are subjective and constructed through ideas. 
Ideas matter in determining political behaviour because they are the lens through which the 
world is interpreted, preferences constructed and, eventually, guides to action. There are no 
objectively self-interested actors, but only actors with sets of subjective ideas about what 
their interests are.20  
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From this perspective, ideas and interests are not rival concepts. Following Mark 
Blyth, the relationship between the two can be better understood by considering interests as 
‘a cluster concept’ that encompasses ideas and will.21 This avoids conceptualising interests 
tautologically, as an ex-post observation (they do it because it is in their interest to do it). 
Then, ‘specifying interests becomes less about structural determination and more about the 
construction of “wants” as mediated by beliefs and desires – that is, ideas.’22 Based on this 
conceptualization of ideas, this article aims to offer a better understanding of the RPF 
ideology, which is predominantly treated in the literature as the tool to advance, and the 
reflection of, interests. Instead, the article shows how and why the RPF came to conceive 
some of its interests the way it did.  
Because ideologies are not straightforward reflections of material conditions, they 
cannot be observed directly. In the striking absence of RPF ideological statements before 
1994, songs written by the RPF and its supporters provide a precious window on their 
ideology. Songs have regularly been used to shed light on the ideas, aspirations, and demands 
of liberation movements across Africa, for instance in Uganda, South Africa, or Zimbabwe.23 
This is unsurprising as songs play an important role in liberation movements. Like the songs 
of social movements, they help to educate members, sympathizers and the wider population 
to the movement’s cause.24 They lift spirits of members and facilitate their mobilization. 
Songs also help to recruit sympathizers by appealing to, or by providing a compelling 
validation to emerging political identities.25 They are consequently a prime site to observe 
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ideology since their functions of education, mobilization, and recruitment require them to 
offer a coherent interpretation of the world, an ideal to fight for, and the means to reach it.  
Songs were an especially powerful vehicle to propagate ideas in the RPF for two main 
reasons. First, they occupied a central place in the strong apparatus of political education. 
They were essential to the ikitamaduni, an evening gathering of singing and dancing 
organized by political commissars. In the bush, around the fire, soldiers could spontaneously 
break into a song whether to promise an exemplary punishment to President Juvénal 
Habyarimana, recount the feats of recent battles, or celebrate the return to the motherland. 
But the importance of songs in circulating ideas went beyond the RPF itself. Even before the 
attack of the RPF on 1 October 1990, songs were the means of identity expression and 
collective memory among its supporters in Rwanda and abroad. Audio tapes circulated 
covertly between families and were smuggled in and out of the country to foster nostalgia for 
the past and hope of return for those who had fled Rwanda since the 1950s following the anti-
Tutsi pogroms. Second, songs are traditionally a crucial form of artistic expression in 
Rwanda. The Rwandan culture is a culture of words. In the virtual absence of visual arts,26 
aesthetics has been expressed through extremely rich verbal and musical arts throughout 
Rwandan society, in every milieu from the court to the poorest family.27  
The twenty songs selected for this article include songs of the RPF itself, used by its 
cultural troupe and/or sung by soldiers, and songs of the struggle in a more general sense, 
sung by RPF sympathizers (Table 1). Although not from the RPF directly, they are a 
testimony of the worldview that RPF supporters were harbouring. All songs are in 
Kinyarwanda, except the song Hatuwezi Kurudi Nyuma (Song O), which is a kind of 
“kinyarwandized” Swahili. It reflects how Swahili has been used at times as a linga franca in 
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the RPF, especially for young people who had lost the Kinyarwanda of their parents while in 
exile.  
Many RPF songs of the liberation struggle exist. Not all are recorded, and some are 
probably already lost. Identifying, recording, transcribing, and translating them is 
consequently a continuous process, and the list presented here is far from exhaustive. The 
article focusses on songs of the pre-genocide period or around the genocide. After a cursory 
examination of about 40 pre-genocide songs known to the authors, 20 were selected because 
they were identified as particularly revealing in terms of ideological content or especially 
renowned. Whole songs, or excerpts from them, have been quoted in the text when 
particularly illustrative. Songs were composed in a decentralized manner, by RPF members, 
soldiers or members of the diaspora. They were often only circulated orally, which means 
that they were prone to change. As a consequence, it was sometimes difficult to make 
definitive attribution to a particular composer. The analysis relies on the earliest known 
version of the song. It concentrates on the lyrics but does not engage with the context or the 
performance. While both can be sources of political messages, such analysis is beyond the 
scope of this article.  
 
Table 1: songs used for the article 
 
  Title of the song in 
Kinyarwanda 
Title translated Composer Date of 
composition 





                                                             
28 The RPF cultural troupe. 
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(1992-93). 
Song B Inkotanyi duhuje 
amarembo 
Inkontayi let’s agree 











Song D Girubuntu  Express your 
humanity through a 
flow of generosity 
Women’s 
group from the 
diaspora  
1990-91 
Song E Turaje We are on our way to 
you  
Women’s 
group from the 
diaspora 
1990-92 
Song F Iya Mbere Ukwakira October 1st  RPF fighters 1990-92 




Song H Ndate Ubutwari 
Bw’inkotanyi 
 
Let me celebrate the 
heroism of Inkontanyi 
Indahemuka 
troupe or RPF 
fighters 
1991-93 





                                                             
29 Literally, Iribori are the stretch marks on the skin, traditionally a sign of beauty of the well-fed women. It 
serves as a metaphor for the intrinsic beauty of Rwanda: a beauty that originates from inside one’s body before 
covering it. 
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Song K Afrika warakubititse Africa you suffered RPF fighters 1990-91 
Song L RPF Turatashye RPF we are coming 
back home 
RPF fighters 1990-91 
Song 
M 





Song N Intare The Lion Annonciata 
Kamaliza 
1992-93 
Song O Hatuwezi kurudi nyuma 
[Swahili] 
We can never retreat RPF fighters 1991 
Song P Mbega Urugendo 
Rurerure  
What a long journey RPF fighters 1990-91 
Song Q Turatashye Inkotanyi 
z’Amarere 
We are coming home, 
intrepid Inkotanyi 
Indahemuka 1990-91 











Song T Gisa Shingiro ry’intwari [Fred] Gisa 





of heroism the Imitali 
group 
 
To operationalize the concept of ideology and show its influence on RPF interests in the post-
genocide period, the analysis distinguishes between ideological paradigms, stable mental 
models of the functioning of the world; problem definitions, ways of framing and 
understanding particular social issues; and policy ideas, which provide potential solutions to 
pre-defined problems.30 This framework makes it possible to finely trace how the ideological 
paradigms, as identified in the songs, influenced the post-genocide era in terms of how the 
RPF defines the problems to be solved and its interests in implementing certain policies. The 
following sections present the main ideological themes identified in the songs and discusses 
how each came to shape RPF interests after 1994.  
 
Singing ideas: the unity of the nation 
Unity is the most conspicuous ideological theme in the songs; the RPF appears obsessed by 
it. Unity, however, is not envisioned as something to be created by the Front, but merely 
reinstated. It constitutes an immanent characteristic of Rwanda, momentarily undermined 
since colonization, and waiting to be fully recovered. 
This is first conveyed by the celebration of an eternal, a-temporal national unity 
embodied by an idealized Rwanda. Song A for instance celebrates the 1993 Arusha accords 
stating that ‘When the world heard the news [of the Arusha negotiations], it was not 
surprised/ The Rwanda of Gasabo had become an example!’ Here, the Rwanda that has 
triumphed over her divisions is designated by the ‘Rwanda of Gasabo’, i.e. the early 
                                                             
30 Tom Lavers and Sam Hickey, Investigating the political economy of social protection expansion in Africa: At 
the intersection of transnational ideas and domestic politics (ESID Working Paper 47, The University of 
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precolonial Rwanda. Gasabo is the region from which the embryonic kingdom expanded 
around the 15th century.31 The idea of the eternal unified Rwanda is also promoted by linking 
unity with the spiritual world of the Rwandan God, Imana. No reference to Christianity is 
made in the songs; rather, spirituality is presented as exclusively pagan and pre-colonial. The 
harmonious Rwanda of Imana is implicitly presented as tainted by Habyarimana. Song P for 
example portrays the eternal magnificent Rwanda as tarnished, to the point that ‘other 
countries mock her’. Erasing the stain of disunity then becomes a divine mission for the RPF. 
Only when Rwanda is restored as united can she regain her sacred status that she should not 
have lost in the first place, as explained in Song B: 
 
Our only goal is unity, which will end injustice 
We bring back the true love that leaves no room for malignancy 
We are rallying around the God of Rwanda 
It is He that gave us the mission to never let the country disappear  
He gave the youth the mission to fight for her 
 
Our only declared objective is to give her back her title of Rwanda 
A Rwanda full of serenity and fulsome, lasting peace 
Let’s make her a marvel that raises Rwandans with care 
[…] 
 
Victory of arms that marks the final end of all conflicts 
Fighters without fear lifted her [Rwanda] up from her dizzying fall 
Oh Comforter that has made us inseparable 
To constitute our country for eternity 
                                                             
31 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom (James Currey, Oxford, 2004), pp. 11 
& 17.  
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So that we can celebrate our Creator! 
 
In addition to the exalted nation, the idea of unity also manifests itself through the 
celebration of the indivisible character of its people. This is the direct rejection of the 
ideology of Hutu Power that portrayed the Tutsi as a foreign minority within a Hutu nation 
and the RPF as an invading force aiming to exploit the Hutu.32 In contrast, the songs of the 
liberation systematically emphasize the belonging of refugees to the national community. 
Songs present them as the children of the same land, and of the same father, the Rwandan 
God Imana, the ‘Comforter that made [Rwandans] inseparable’ (Song B). Unity is also 
celebrated through the political events of the time such as the 1993 Arusha accords in Song 
A:  
 
Our seat [at the negotiating table] has brought victory 
We reconcile the Rwanda of inside and outside 
[….] 
Celebrate this, Rwandan, wherever you are, 
The peace for which we fought has come at last. 
 
Here, the Arusha accords are a victory insofar as they make the refugees re-join the national 
community by reconciling ‘the Rwanda of inside and outside’. Song B similarly celebrates 
the Arusha negotiations through the prism of unity: 
 
Parties that found many areas of convergence with the Inkotanyi [name of RPF 
fighters], 
Let’s redouble our efforts to vanquish this common enemy 
                                                             
32 Mahmood Mamdani, When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001), p. 190. 
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Our fraternal trinity is a patrimonial pact 
 
This excerpt also addresses the issue of ethnicity, evoking the ‘fraternal trinity’ (inyabatatu), 
a reference to Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, which constitutes a ‘patrimonial pact’, i.e. descended 
from the same ancestor. The unity of the people is further heralded in Song C, as the cardinal 
value that also justifies the refugees’ right to return:  
 
Let’s celebrate democracy 
Rwanda is ours, no one can contest it 
The proof is, we are all from the same father!  
 
[chorus:] The way forward is unity 
Everything else is secondary […] 
 
The true democracy does not practice discrimination 
Neither racial nor ethnic discrimination, nor favouritism 
All of us Rwandans share our national rights 
 
The idea that the unity must be protected or restored is not exclusive to the RPF. It is 
a constant feature of Rwandan leaders’ rhetoric since independence.33 Yet unity was not 
synonymous with equality between ethnicities for Grégoire Kayibanda and Habyarimana. 
Both presidents publicly subscribed to an element of the Hamitic hypothesis, portraying Tutsi 
as ultimately non-indigenous, late-comers on the Rwandan soil, who subjugated the Hutu, 
and should consequently keep a low profile.34 By contrast, the idea of unity conveyed in the 
                                                             
33 Deborah Mayersen, ‘“Fraternity in diversity” or “feudal fanatics”? Representations of ethnicity in Rwandan 
presidential rhetoric’, Patterns of Prejudice 49, 3 (2015), pp. 249-270. 
34 Ibid., Verwimp, Peasants in power, pp. 50-52. 
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songs emphasizes not so much the equality between ethnicities but the irrelevance of 
ethnicity as a category. 
Using the framework presented in the introduction, it is possible to trace how the pre-
genocide ideology of unity came to define problems and corresponding interests, as observed 
through policies, in the post-genocide era. A comparison with the analysis of Johan Pottier or 
Reyntjens on the RPF’s discourse about unity after the genocide reveals that the ideology of 
unity, as articulated in songs, has survived the genocide virtually unaltered.35 It clearly 
influenced the framing and understanding of particular social problems after 1994. It made 
the problem of disunity less a problem of ethnic representation or individual rights than an 
issue of rediscovering the Rwandan national identity and its immanent ‘one-ness’.36 
Consequently, the problem of unity has never been interpreted by the RPF as an issue of 
ethnic balancing in political posts and in the staffing of the state and the army or as a 
condition of security for each group as in Burundi.37 Nor has it been articulated as a problem 
of federating nations as in Ethiopia.38  
Such problem definition has been consequential in terms of policy ideas: the 
promotion of unity has been fused with a nation building project (a dynamic absent in 
Burundi for instance). It has become a project to rediscover “Rwandan-ness” and Rwandan 
values, and to foster homogenization by undermining other salient identity categories; 
ethnicity but also regionalism. The RPF has, for example, changed the names of the country’s 
main localities, redesigned administrative boundaries, and instituted a unique nation-wide 
constituency for MPs elected by proportional representation. Such an ideology of unity is of 
course conspicuous in the much-commented policy which bans any public references to 
                                                             
35Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Reyntjens, ‘(Re-)imagining’. 
36 Purdeková, Making ubumwe, p. 12.  
37 Stef Vandeginste, ‘Governing ethnicity after genocide: Ethnic amnesia in Rwanda versus ethnic power-
sharing in Burundi’ Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, 2 (2014), pp. 263-277. 
38 Jon Abbink, ‘Ethnic-based federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing the experiment after 20 years’, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 5, 4 (2011), pp. 596-618. 
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ethnicity.39 More generally, policies are geared towards leveraging whatever serves the 
Rwandan “one-ness” - the discursive emphasis on common values and culture – through a re-
imagination of Rwandan “traditions” (as discussed below). Such a conception of unity 
through homogenization opens the space for the re-fashioning of society, which helps to 
explain Rwanda’s distinct, and at times unpopular, high-modernist project and attempt to 
“change mindsets” (as discussed below). 
There is no denying that such a conception of unity can powerfully serve RPF 
interests by supporting its rule. But the idea of a post-ethnic society was articulated long 
before the RPF gained power and may, in this respect, also reflect a genuine ideal rather than 
solely a strategy to conceal Tutsi domination. This is further supported if one keeps in mind 
that these songs, which consistently promoted an a-ethnic unity above all else, were used first 
and foremost to mobilize and recruit Tutsi fighters.  
 
Singing ideas: an inclusive RPF and a manipulative enemy 
The portrayal of the RPF and its enemies is also instructive ideologically. The songs depict 
the RPF as an inclusive movement by presenting it with a multi-ethnic face and minimising 
its Tutsi-dominated nature. This has been a constant concern for the Front since its beginning. 
For instance, at its creation, the RPF pretended that its executive committee was 
predominantly Hutu.40 It also recruited and put Hutu in high positions in the party, as 
publicized in songs. Song F reminds listeners that some of Habyarimana’s senior officers 
‘joined the Inkotanyi [name of the RPF fighters], such as Major Lizinde, Commandant 
Biseruka, and many others.’ Song G gives a central place to Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe. A 
high-profile Hutu from Habyarimana’s native region in the North, he was instrumental in the 
coup that put Habyarimana in power in 1973 and subsequently served as his minister of 
                                                             
39 Vandeginste, ‘Governing ethnicity’. 
40 Filip Reyntjens ‘Les mouvements armés de réfugiés rwandais: Rupture ou continuité?’, Civilisations 40, 2 
(1992), pp. 170-182, pp. 176-177. 
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internal affairs. He fled to Tanzania in 1980 amidst rumours of coup plotting and later joined 
the RPF. After the death of Fred Rwigema, the charismatic original leader of the RPF, he 
became chairman of the Front in 1990, although real power remained behind the scene in 
Tutsi hands. Considering that the UN general Roméo Dallaire described Kanyarengwe as the 
‘titular head’ of the RPF, ‘a little uneasy in his leadership role, constantly checking for the 
reaction of others after making a remark’,41 it is ironic that in Song G:  
 
Kanyarengwe told Paul [Kagame] 
‘Sit so that we can plan 
Let’s find how to reach the centre [of the country] 
 
Far from being the uneasy token Hutu with no real power, Kanyarengwe appears as a military 
strategist, discussing as equal, if not as his superior, with Paul Kagame. He is made the main 
character of the whole verse, asking Kagame to ‘sit down’ to discuss important strategic 
matters. Later in the song: 
 
 Habyarimana, not knowing what to do, 
 Used the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities as a pretext 
 Colonel Kanyarengwe quickly told him: 
 ‘Stop all this intrigue, it is the source of the misery that has devastated Rwanda 
 When we parted, you were responsible for it 
 
Here it is Kanyarengwe himself, a Hutu from the North and former member of the Akazu, 
Habyarimana’s inner circle, who admonishes Habyarimana for his divisive politics.  
                                                             
41 Roméo Dallaire, Shake hands with the devil: The failure of humanity in Rwanda (Random House Canada, 
Toronto, 2003), p. 65.  
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Songs also portray the RPF as fighting for the common good and not seeking revenge 
or domination. This can be contrasted with the depiction of the Inkotanyi by Hutu extremists 
as only moved by the desire to subjugate the Hutu population and revert back to the 
exploitive, Tutsi-dominated ancien régime.42 The idea of RPF benevolence towards all 
Rwandans is instilled by emphasising that its fight results from an irresistible longing for the 
homeland. For example, Song I links the courage of an unnamed Inkotanyi hero to his desire 
to go back to his country: 
 
 ‘He fights against the enemy that denies him his right to come back home’ 
 […] ‘Let him fight them and come back to the country of his ancestor, the country of 
Rwandans.’  
 
The celebration of Rwanda’s beauty is also a way to demonstrate the RPF 
nationalism. It conveys the longing of the refugees for their homeland. The song Inganzo 
y’Umunezero (song R) epitomizes this. Despite being the official song of the RPF Radio 
Muhabura, it does not mention politics, the war, or the refugees’ plight once. It confines itself 
to exalt the wonders of Rwanda, as in this stanza: 
 
What would I mention, what would I leave out? 
Among the marvels of this Rwanda 
Where to begin and where to stop 
To honour and celebrate her? 
At the small summits, the hills, the volcanoes? 
At the plains and the beautiful valleys, 
At the lakes and the forests?  
                                                             
42 Mamdani, When victims, p. 189.  
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The emphasis on the RPF’s patriotism is elsewhere made more explicit. Song E 
emphasizes that it is not an alien movement that retains loyalty to the countries its members 
and supporters had settled in. Indeed, they ‘leave definitely foreign countries,’ ‘without 
leaving anything behind’ because they ‘miss Rwanda so much.’ The anaphora ‘Turaje’ (we 
are on our way to you) that starts all the 30 lines of the song reinforces the impression that the 
return is both certain and irreversible. The scale of the return is also massive. It is entire 
families which are coming back: old people and ‘babies hardly weaned off their mother’s 
breast’. The returnees ask to be ‘recognized […] as children of the same father’. In addition, 
the Inkotanyi gives guarantees of their unwillingness to take revenge: they come back ‘not to 
loot’, ‘without hatred in [their] heart’ and with ‘no resentment for what happened in the past’. 
Instead, they want to ‘join forces’ to ‘work for the future of Rwanda’ and ‘genuine progress’. 
Through the songs, the RPF also demonstrates its benevolence by appearing as a 
legitimate, sensible, and expert actor. This is for instance evident in the evocation of the 
Arusha peace negotiations. The movement comes across as a trusted negotiating party 
dealing with other parties on an equal footing as in Song A:  
 
On August 4, we were in Arusha, 
The path of the RPF was recognized first 
Their poise, their courage and their great expertise, 
All parties accepted and signed for this, signed for this! 
 
[…]  
Radio Muhabura and Radio Kigali 
They showed professionalism and they sent out the news […] 
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Both the RPF Radio – Radio Muhabura – and Radio Rwanda [called – perhaps 
intentionally - Radio Kigali] broadcast the news of the Arusha negotiations, reinforcing the 
image of equality between the voices of the RPF and of the Rwandan government. Songs also 
emphasize the educated character of the Front. Celebrating the military progress of the RPF, 
song H concludes that ‘this demonstrated to the Movement [Habyarimana’s party] that they 
[the Inkotanyi] really studied.’ Song P similarly explains: 
 
You [Habyarimana] spend your time lying to the people 
Like how the Inkotanyi did not study and spoke nonsense, 
How do you explain that we have our own radio Muhabura? 
Since we are supposed to be uncultured, uneducated?  
 
Such an intriguing emphasis on the educated character of the RPF can be understood as the 
counter narrative to the Habyarimana propaganda. The regime depicted the Inkotanyi as a 
bunch of uneducated vagrants (ingengera) that grew up in camps abroad, or as the natural 
enemy of Rwanda (inyangarwanda), not refugees trying to come back to their homeland and 
worth negotiating with. In contrast, the songs promote the idea of a disciplined expert 
movement that ‘fights in order’ (Song B) with ‘precise and organized objectives’ (Song C) to 
eventually ‘work for the country with intelligence’ (Song E). 
The portrayal of the enemy in songs is also instructive ideologically. While there is 
some literature on the Habyarimana regime and Hutu extremists’ vision of their enemy, 
notably through songs,43 works on the RPF’s vision of the enemy are largely absent. The 
contrast between how each side portrays the other is stark. Whereas the Hutu extremists 
systematically degraded and dehumanized the RPF, and the Tutsi, viewed as their natural 
                                                             
43 E.g. Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Rwanda: Les médias du génocide (Karthala, Paris, 1995). 
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supporters,44 such violent imagery is absent from RPF songs. A distinction is made between 
Habyarimana and his entourage and the wider (and de facto mainly Hutu) population. The 
blame in songs rarely falls on the population, although the anti-Tutsi popular pogroms since 
independence are the cause of the refugees’ plight. The population is only portrayed as 
oppressed or manipulated by the regime. The real enemy is Habyarimana and his akazu. Song 
F clearly distinguishes between Habyarimana and the wider population, making the 
population its victim: ‘The Rwanda of Rwandans that you [Habyarimana] debase/ We, the 
intrepid Inkotanyi, will cure it.’ Songs composed during or shortly after the genocide, when 
the extent of the horror began to be known, are especially interesting to consider in order to 
explore how the issue of guilt is addressed. Songs J and S, both composed in 1994, come 
closest to blaming not only Habyarimana and his entourage but also wider sections of the 
population. Yet, the tone is never vindictive, violent or degrading. Song S, the only song that 
describes graphically the violence the RPF encountered, only designates the enemy in a non-
specific manner, only using the pronoun ‘they’: ‘They decimated the new born and the babies 
hardly weaned off the maternal breast, even those in the maternal womb were prematurely 
and violently taken out.’ The enemy here is recognized as enemy only through their horrible 
deeds and not through their identity. In Song J: 
 
Your Ikinani was approached and we tried everything to reason with him 
The other day he had a nasty surprise for Rwanda 
Couldn’t you sense the tragedy that was looming?  
 
You had transformed Rwanda into an akazu 
Those who would not comply became the sworn enemy 
This resentment led you to do the irredeemable 




We tried everything, you just did not want to hear 
[…] 
 
The enemy’s greatest guilt is to have followed the regime in its folly and not seen ‘the 
tragedy that was looming’. Yet, the enemy here is the enemy only insofar as they have been 
fooled by Habyarimana. The war and the genocide are the results of the stubbornness of the 
other side. The self-proclaimed nickname of Habyarimana, Ikinani, or the ‘invincible one’, is 
used to ridicule him and show his absurdity.  
While songs evoke warfare, there is no fascination with or glorification of violence 
(contrary to genocide discourse).45 Violence is presented as the sad, regrettable consequence 
of the obstinacy of the Habyarimana regime. In all songs, with the exception of Song S 
mentioned above, the language of violence is subdued, indirect, coated in an epic and heroic 
language. Overall, depiction of the enemy operates through a great deal of restraint. The 
restraint is first in scope. The enemy is carefully defined in contrast to the expansive and 
generalized characterizations from the Hutu extremists. It is not the (mainly Hutu) Rwandan 
population but the Habyarimana regime and, as discussed below, its foreign patrons. 
Restraint is also linguistic. Lyrics do not feature hatred of the enemy nor do they use a 
degrading language. Here there is no use of ‘animalization, vulgarity, scatology’ or 
‘pornography’ that Hutu power resorted to in its media to designate the RPF, its supporters, 
and more generally the Tutsi.46  
These ideas of an inclusive and expert RPF fighting an enemy that is not the entire 
population, but a manipulative elite, has impacted how the RPF defined problems and 
policies in the post-genocide era. For example, the overarching problem of rebuilding the 
                                                             
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., p. 376. Translated from the French. 
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country has also become a problem of giving guarantees to the Hutu majority, a problem that 
songs allude to when providing re-assurance that refugees are not uneducated thugs ‘coming 
to loot’. The earliest policy manifestation of this was the effort to include the opposition in 
the government of national unity and formally stick to the Arusha accords, albeit in an 
adapted form. As explained by Omar McDoom, ‘although the RPF enjoyed [the] benefits as a 
result of being an outright military victor, it should be recognized that it chose not to press 
home all of its advantages. It was not “winner-take-all”’. And yet, other options were 
available to the RPF: ‘The RPF could for example have ruled as a single party as happened in 
Uganda after its Bush War which brought Yoweri Museveni’s [National Resistance 
Movement] NRM to power in 1986 [...] Instead the RPF undertook several, important 
confidence-building measures designed to reassure Rwanda’s Hutu majority.’47 While, for 
example, the RPF concentrated the power in its hands, ‘it was nonetheless the first time in 
Rwanda’s post-colonial history that power had been shared even nominally – across ethnic 
lines.’48 This practice has continued ever since. Informally, some ethnic balancing remains a 
criterion in the allocation of political posts.49 More generally, the unusual success of public 
sector reforms in Rwandan has been explained as an attempt by RPF to demonstrate its expert 
and impartial character as well as its capacity to deliver development for all citizens.50  
Similarly, the RPF perception of itself as being destined to give the country ‘back her 
title of Rwanda’ and restore harmony has been consequential in terms of policy ideas. This 
mission, combined with the RPF will to appear “expert”, helps to make sense in the policy 
sphere of the ‘high modernist’ or ‘social engineering’ drive that is the hallmark of Rwandan 
                                                             
47 Omar McDoom, Rwanda’s exit pathway from violence: A strategic assessment (World Development Report 
2011 Background Case Study 62054, Word Bank, Washington DC, 2011), p. 11. 
48 Ibid., p. 12. 
49 Purdeková, Making ubumwe, p. 84. 
50 Benjamin Chemouni, The politics of core public sector reform in Rwanda (ESID working paper n°88, 
University of Manchester, 2017).  
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post-genocide governance.51 At a more micro-level, the problem definition of restoring 
Rwanda’s dignity while demonstrating expertise also helps understanding the ‘moral 
authority and paternalism’52 of officials who ‘know better’53 regularly underlined in the 
scholarship.54 High modernism also serves as the demonstration that the RPF is not the 
uneducated thuggish group depicted by the previous regime. Such a concern even extends to 
the president according to Purdekovà: ‘The bespectacled President of Rwanda, versed in 
economics and politics, has carefully worked against the popular Rwandan stereotype of a 
military leader taking over power – the inkandagirabitabo or literally “one who marches over 
the books” – a dismissive reference to ill-educated soldiers in high positions of power.’55  
 
Singing ideas: idealization of the pre-colonial past 
The songs convey a strong idealization of the pre-colonial past. While several authors have 
underlined this ideological trait of the RPF, analysis of songs helped to better grasp how this 
was done and what exactly in the pre-colonial past is celebrated.56 Idealization of the past is 
first achieved by inscribing the rebellion in the precolonial military legend and multiplying 
references to traditional practices of warfare. In song H for instance, the decision to attack on 
1 October 1990 is recounted as follows: 
 
When the challenges set reached their highest level, 
The Inkotanyi declared: ‘we took an oath  
The endless UN [United Nations] way never succeeds’ 
In broad daylight, we just crossed the border 
                                                             
51 Malin Hasselskog, ‘Rwandan developmental “social engineering”’.. 
52 Ibid, p. 63.  
53 Reyntjens, ‘(Re-)imagining’, p. 75. 
54 See also An Ansoms, ‘Re-engineering rural society: The visions and ambitions of the Rwandan elite’, African 
Affairs 108, 431 (2009), pp. 289-309.  
55 Purdeková, Making ubumwe, p. 229.  
56 E.g. Johan Pottier, ‘Re-imagining Rwanda’, pp. 109-123; Reyntjens, ‘(Re-)imagining’. 
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The song refers here to the traditional practice of ‘setting challenges’ or imihigo, when 
fighters in the pre-colonial period would compete with one another by publicly pledging to 
reach ambitious objectives. Songs also use an epic style and portray the war as if fought in a 
precolonial time. Song G, about the RPF attack, tells this story: 
 
I dreamt that we crossed the Umuyanja River [between Uganda and Rwanda] 
With my bow on my shoulder 
My arrows 
My shield and spears 
[…] 
 
Song I uses an epic tone to present Fred Rwigema as the figure of the traditional 
Rwandan hero. 
 
The one who throws himself into battle with courage 
The one whose face shows both gravity and determination 
The one who never misses his target, loosing off arrows which fly as in a trance 
 
Warfare is depicted in anachronistic terms, especially when talking about weapons. There is 
no celebration of guns and rifles: the traditional spears, arrows and bows are their 
metaphors.57 Song G calls the RPF fighters intwaramiheto, literally ‘those who carry bows.’  
                                                             
57 An exception is the song Abasore Turatashye, not included in the sample because it could not be obtained in 
full. The chorus proudly lists the weapons the RPF owns (‘Fourteen, One-Twenty, Sans Recul na Katyusha, 
RPG…’). However, the point here is probably more to show once again the expertise and modernity of the RPF 
than a fascination for modern warfare. The song indeed denounces that the regime ‘treated’ the RPF as ‘petty 
thugs’ [ingegera], which the list of modern weapons aims to contradict.  
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Overall, the songs implicitly make the Inkotanyi the heirs of an epic past of great 
exploits. The name Inkotanyi itself refers to a military formation in precolonial Rwanda 
under king Yuhi IV Gahindiro. By doing so, they assert the RPF’s unquestionable Rwandan 
character, the legitimacy of its fight for the refugees’ return, and celebrates a pre-colonial 
past of great feats to reconnect with.  
A deep anti-imperialist ideology parallels the exaltation of the precolonial past. The 
misfortune of Rwanda, and more generally of Africa, are presented ultimately as an evil 
brought by foreigners. Song K, with the revealing title ‘Afrika warakubititse’ (Africa, you 
suffered), and song L ‘R.P.F. Turatashye’ (RPF we are coming back) are the most 
representative in this respect.58 In Song K:  
 
1. It started under the form of a conspiracy 
They shared Africa between the three of them, 
They divided it in three parts, 
Africa found itself muzzled 
 
Chorus: Africa you suffered, Africa you were brought down (x2) 
 
2. They came wearing robes [cassocks], they banned Rwanda’s culture 
The dance and the gathering around the fire lost their place in Rwanda, plotting 
gained acceptance 
They demanded to be presented with gifts 
They declared themselves Gods before us, we confessed to them our sins! 
 
3.Musinga disapproved of them, denounced them and kept them at a distance 
                                                             
58 They also feature in French in Chrétien, Rwanda: Les medias but have been here retranslated from 
Kinyarwanda.  
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Mandela disapproved of them,… 
Rwagasore disapproved of them,… 
Nyerere disapproved of them,… 
Once in Rwanda, they took the ruler and threw him behind the forest,59 they made 
him the laughing stock of foreigners. 
 
4. Muhumuza disapproved of them, denounced them and kept them at a distance 
Basebya disapproved of them,… 
Mandela disapproved of them,… 
Rukeba disapproved of them,… 
Samora disapproved of them,… 
Kabarega disapproved of them,… 
Once in Rwanda, they took the ruler and threw him behind the forest, they made 
him the laughing stock of foreigners 
 
5. Some Rwandans served them, were made their instruments 
They placed in them the idea of segregation, and the hatred spread 
Habyarimana became their client, he chased away the natives, and closed behind 
them the borders of the country, nostalgia has taken hold of us 
 
6.He instituted oppression and called it the policy of [ethnic] equilibrium 
Rwandans suffered, ignorance spread 
In schools and in access to jobs, he established ethnic and regional discrimination. 
Some natives died in restless wandering as if they had no native land.  
 
                                                             
59 Reference to the fact that the Belgians deposed the king Yuhi Musinga in 1931 and sent him to Kamembe in 
the far southwestern corner of Rwanda, beyond the Nyungwe forest, before exiling him to Congo. 
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7. Go, Mutara, you who disapproved of them and kept them at distance, go, we keep 
the memory of your deeds 
Go, Bisangwa, go, you who had the courage to take your bow against them, 
Your predictions came true, the Inkontanyi entered Rwanda 
The lies cannot find space to spread anymore, truth prevails in Rwanda, 
Habyarimana is vanquished.  
 
The Rwandan figures in the song embody the historical resistance to the colonizers. 
Biographic elements of these characters are a testament of the anti-imperialist, nationalist and 
inclusive ideology the RPF is seeking to promote (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: characters in Song K 
 
Character Description 
King Yuhi Musinga (1896-1931)  
 
Tried to preserve his power against the whites, 
when Rwanda first came under the colonial rule. 
Muhumuza Prophetess in the north of the kingdom who 
claimed to incarnate the Nyabingi divinity. She 
resisted the colonizers but also the attempts of the 
court to control the Hutu northern kingdoms. She 
was eventually captured by the British in 1911 and 
died in 1945. 
Basebya Twa who led a revolt against taxation in 1905 in 
Northern Rwanda. He was tracked and eventually 
executed by the German in 1911 
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Bisangwa Traditional chief and a force commander sent by 
King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri to fight the Germans 
South of Lake Kivu in 1896. 
François Rukeba A Hutu who was selected to be the nominal founder 
and president of the monarchist, Tutsi-dominated 
nationalist and anti-colonialist Union nationale 
rwandaise (UNAR) party in 1959.  
Mutara III Rudahigwa (1911-
1959) 
King between 1931 and 1959. He eventually asked 
for independence. He died in Bujumbura in 1959 
while meeting with the colonial authorities, which 
are suspected to have deliberately killed him. 
 
The choice of Rwandan heroes in the song is eclectic. It is likely to appeal across regional 
and ethnic divides, reinforcing the picture of the RPF as an inclusive movement. While some 
are heroes linked to the Tutsi monarchy (Bisangwa, Musinga, and Mutara), other such as the 
prophetess Muhumuza and the Twa rebel Basebya are figures associated with the history of 
resistance of the northern Hutu kingdoms to their assimilation in the newly colonized 
Rwandan kingdom. Interestingly, as showed by Chrétien, some figures were also used at the 
same time by the opposing side in its anti-Tutsi propaganda.60 The famous extremist singer 
Bikindi, leader of the group Irindiro, used the figure of Basebya in his song ‘Sons of the 
Father of the Cultivators’. By mobilising figures who supported the northern Hutu kingdoms, 
Bikindi’s aim, according to Chrétien, was to ‘illustrate the pathetic saga of a centuries-long 
repression of “Hutu kinglets” by the Tutsi’.61  
                                                             
60 Chrétien, Rwanda: Les medias, p.358.  
61 Ibid. p. 344. Translated from the French.  
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Significantly, this Rwandan hall of fame is echoed by an African one, featuring the 
famous anti-colonial figures of Nelson Mandela, Julius Nyerere, Samora Machel, the 
Burundian Rwagasore, and Kabarega, the king of Bunyoro in Uganda, who resisted the 
efforts of Great Britain to make the kingdom a protectorate at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Doing so, the RPF sought to universalize its struggle, making it a fight for Africa 
more generally. As argued by Roessler and Verhoeven, this Pan-Africanist and anti-
imperialist ideology has also  to be replaced in the wider context of the African neo-liberation 
movements of the 1980s and 1990s, such as the NRM or the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which “arose in opposition to the emergence of a 
new class of dictators and authoritarian leaders who their critics conceived as neo-colonial for 
perpetuating policies of social exclusion to advance the interests of the ruling elite”.62 
Song L also conflates the current problems of Rwanda and the refugees with the issue of 
colonization, making Habyarimana the whites’ servant: 
 
Children of Rwanda, for so many years we have been left to our fate, we have 
wandered in foreign countries 
But now we are coming home 
 
Chorus : RPF, RPF we are coming home (x2) 
 
2. It is the white man who caused all this, children of Rwanda 
In order to find an opportunity to steal from us. 
 
3. When they arrived, we lived side by side in harmony 
They were dissatisfied not finding the means to divide us 
                                                             
62 Roessler and Verhoeven, When comrades, p. 44. 
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4.They invented and attached origins to us, children of Rwanda: some came from 
Chad, others from Ethiopia 
 
5.We were a beautiful harmonious tree, children of Rwanda. Some of us were 
banished abroad, to never come back 
 
6. We were separated by division, children of Rwanda, but the trap of the white 
man, we identified it and avoided it. 
 
7. This Habyarimana that you see, children of Rwanda, he came round to the whites’ 
plan that wanted to keep us abroad forever. 
 
8.We the Inkontanyi, we reject that, children of Rwanda, we are determined to fight 
and to vanquish him. 
 
9. Thus, children of Rwanda, we are all called upon to unite our forces to build 
Rwanda. 
 
The external world here bears the blame for the fate of Rwanda. Colonizers divided 
Rwandans as they banned Rwanda’s culture and tradition, the ‘eternal lights’ of unity and 
democracy according to Song C. This argument is extended over time, to characterize the 
current situation, and over space, to the whole African continent. The whites are also blamed 
for the fate of Rwandan refugees. Song L even identifies a ‘whites’ plan’ to keep the refugees 
out of the country. Habyarimana is the lackey of westerners, a neo-colonial tool in the hands 
of his ‘patrons’ (Song K). He is regularly ridiculed for calling his white masters for help 
when in difficulty. Song F explains that: 
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The armies of the Movement [Habyarimana’s MRND ruling party] came running 
When they saw us, they immediately ran for their lives 
The profiteers [foreigners] learned about it and came running, 
Saying ‘we are losing a servant!’ 
 
Habyarimana roamed foreign countries 
Crying in front of the whites for them to rescue him 
[…] 
 
Westerners are also blamed for their misunderstanding of the refugees’ situation. 
Song H explains that ‘The whites took to their books/To try to understand this war’. This 
echoes the colonizers’ misunderstanding of Rwandan culture and people, which led them for 
instance to ‘invent [Rwandans] origins’ as put in song L. 
The RPF’s idealization of precolonial times along with its anti-imperialism have had 
clear ramifications in terms of problem definition and policy ideas after the genocide. In 
terms of problem definition, the ideology has produced an interpretation of the world that is 
highly historicized and mythicized.63 The ordeal of Rwanda is understood as an aberration of 
history that the RPF aims to correct. Western powers, who subsequently aided Rwandan neo-
colonial regimes, are ultimately responsible for the country’s ‘fall from Heaven’. The RPF 
struggle becomes an attempt to end Rwanda’s century of shame. From this overarching 
problem definition logically derive two others: minimising foreign influence and reviving the 
Rwandan eternal values defiled by imperialism. 
On the latter, the main policy implication is that the reviving of Rwandan ‘traditional’ 
values is the antidote to the country’s fate. As a result, ‘in the last two decades, Rwanda has 
                                                             
63 See also Reyntjens, ‘(Re-) imagining’. 
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seen a profusion of reinvented “traditional” institutions’,64 the so-called “home-grown” 
solutions. These include for example the gacaca courts, the girinka livestock distribution 
programme, the itorero civic education camps, the agaciro sovereign fund. One of the most 
famous is the imihigo, a term encountered in song H, that came to define in the 2000s the 
performance contracts that have pervaded the whole state bureaucracy. However, what 
actually goes on ‘is a skilful government-led reinvention, and often plain experimentation 
rather than a recovery of activities from the popular pre-colonial past’.65 Only a better 
understanding of the RPF’s ideology and problem definition helps to explain such an 
apparent contradiction. Tradition in songs is never conservative or reactionary: there are no 
references to Tutsi elitism, ethnic divides or exaltation of the monarchy. The ultimate 
problem for the RPF is Rwanda’s lack of unity and values as a result of Western influence, 
not the disappearance of the pre-colonial order per se. Neotraditional practices are, 
consequently, less about fidelity with history than about activating and drawing on an 
imagined ideal to foster unity and independence. 
Another consequence of RPF ideology in terms of problem-definition is that western 
influence has to be limited. This helps to better make sense of the ‘regime’s assertive, at 
times arrogant stance and their often fraught relations with the world’ perceived by 
diplomats, donors, and scholars.66 Such assertiveness is compounded by the idea that 
foreigners do not necessarily understand Rwanda’s reality. While this Rwandan 
exceptionalism has been linked to the experience of the genocide,67 the songs show that it has 
older origins. It finds its source in the exaltation of Rwanda’s culture and past, and in the 
misunderstanding of the refugees’ ordeal. Song B, for example, decries ‘the whites [who] 
took to their books to try to understand this war.’ As a consequence, aid becomes a double-
                                                             
64 Purdeková, Making ubumwe, p. 152. 
65 Ibid. p. 155. 
66 Reyntjens, ‘(Re-)imagining’, p. 69. 
67 Ibid. p. 70. 
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edged sword for the RPF. It is needed to restore the country’s greatness but is also a potential 
conduit for neo-colonial domination, thus calling for self-reliance in the long run. 
This problem definition has been consequential in the policy realm. Generally, it 
sheds light on the RPF’s will ‘to exert considerable agency in the donor relationship.’68 
Furthermore, policies are logically geared towards reducing aid dependency, frames as an 
issue of independence but also dignity. As a result, self-reliance receives greater importance 
in Rwanda than in many other African countries. For example, in 2012, the creation of the 
agaciro [dignity] sovereign fund following aid cuts was presented ‘as a common goal against 
external threat (Western donors), which was perceived to be attacking Rwanda’s 
sovereignty’.69 Guarding against foreign actors’ interference requires self-reliance at the 
national but also at the individual level. This has taken the form of a paternalist social 
engineering project, mentioned above, of ‘changing mind-sets’ so that people become actors 
of development, not passive recipients of aid, as observed in social policies. In health for 
example, ideas played a clear role in the RPF’s choice of a compulsory community-based 
health insurance to improve financial access to healthcare. Although some other policy 
options were more popular among the population and donors, they were not selected because 
they were incompatible with the RPF ideology of national and individual self-reliance, which 
called for a compulsory population-wide contribution.70 Similarly, the ideology of national 
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By exploring the ideology of the RPF through songs of political mobilization, this article 
makes three main contributions. First, it contributes to the scholarship on Rwanda by 
demonstrating the value of adopting a more constructivist perspective in interpreting the 
RPF’s interests after the genocide. Interests did not emerge in a straightforward manner from 
the post-genocide structural conditions but were, to a significant extent, constructed through 
ideas that have remained surprisingly stable over time. Only by reconceptualising ‘interests’ 
as a cluster concept that subsumes ideology can it become possible to fully understand why 
the RPF came to conceive of some of its interests the way it did. It helps to explain, for 
example, why the RPF, among many options compatible with its ‘material interests’, chose a 
particular course of action, for instance resorting to reinvented traditions to legitimize highly 
experimental, forward-looking policies. The role of ideas is best demonstrated when ideology 
seems to undermine the RPF’s ‘objective’ material interests. The bulk of the literature on 
Rwanda underlines that the RPF’s top-down, at times coercive, developmental project, and its 
forced-march reconciliation through ethnic amnesia, creates popular resentments and 
structural violence that might jeopardize stability in the long run.72 How then can we explain 
that these are so forcefully adopted by a regime so concerned with its legitimacy? Similarly, 
material interests cannot fully explain the defiant stance towards donors in a context of 
extreme resource scarcity. For example, in the health sector, the government has sometimes 
been ready to forego foreign aid for ideological reasons.73 It is only by taking the normative 
power of ideas seriously that we can explain these potentially self-defeating behaviours. 
While the literature has emphasized the role of ideology as the instrument ‘to legitimize 
policies that have little popular support’,74 the opposite is true as well: policies, including 
those that have little popular support, are, to a significant extent, the consequence of 
ideology. 
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The article does not deny that material interests influence ideas: just because ideas 
have deep roots does not mean that they were not partly shaped, at some point in time, by 
material conditions. Nor does it contest that other dynamics outside of ideas also influence 
interests. Yet, by tracing the pre-genocide origins of ideas and their extraordinary resilience 
even through the critical juncture of the genocide, the article aimed to establish their genuine 
power in mediating the effects of material interests in shaping political behaviour in post-
genocide Rwanda. The persistence of ideas despite fast-changing material circumstances is 
perhaps the best demonstration that their link with the material is not direct and that they 
have more traction and longevity than assumed.  
The second contribution to the study of Rwanda is empirical. The article uses new 
source material, songs of mobilization which are, for their vast majority translated for the 
first time in English, to systematically delineate the RPF’s original ideology. Works 
concerned with its ideology have used sources mainly from the post-genocide period. As a 
result, their claims, while valid after 1994, generally lack empirical justification for when the 
RPF was only a rebellion. This article corrects this while avoiding relying on ex-post, and 
potentially reconstructed and self-serving, narratives. By the same token, the article is able to 
ascertain a very high degree of continuity in RPF ideology. The ideological themes identified 
have all survived the exercise of power with no significant alteration since they are present in 
the literature that discusses the RPF’s current ideological stance.75 However, since 1994, new 
themes have emerged or became more prominent: the idea of self-reliance, of Rwanda’s 
exceptionalism, and of developmentalism.76 Yet, these did not come ex-nihilo. They drew 
heavily on an existing world vision. The emphasis on self-reliance can be traced back to the 
RPF’s suspicion towards the external world. The idea of exceptionalism already transpires in 
the songs, through the glorification of Rwanda and through the idea that outsiders since 
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colonial times do not understand Rwanda’s culture. The current ideology of top-down, fast-
paced development also draws on a multiplicity of pre-genocide ideological sources: the 
idealization of Rwanda, the divine mission of the RPF to restore the dignity of the country, 
and the RPF’s vision of itself as an organization that must convince of its inclusive and 
expert character. In addition, this study uncovers some important ideological themes that 
further our knowledge of the RPF: the great restraint in its portrayal of the enemy, and an 
early emphasis on RPF expertise and education as a way to convince others of its 
benevolence. The songs qualify the image of the RPF as a self-assured force by revealing its 
awareness of its vulnerability and its vital need to give guarantees, thus shining new light on 
Rwanda’s high-modernist and technocratic drive.  
The article has, finally, both methodological and theoretical implications for the study 
of African politics. Methodologically, it draws attention to the importance of art forms to 
understand rebel organizations. In general, rebel organizations have very poor institutional 
memory – compounded by high illiteracy rates amongst rank and file soldiers – that hinders 
empirical knowledge of their ideology. In addition, rebellion songs allow a direct access to 
ideological discourse as produced during the war. Mobilization songs are thus 
methodologically invaluable to reflect on the war-to-peace transition and to analyse 
something as difficult to observe as ideas. From a theoretical standpoint, this analysis re-
asserts the role of ideas as a normative source of transformation. The focus in the study of 
African politics on the materiality of political behaviour through the prism of clientelism, 
kinship, belly politics or utility-maximising actors is reductive. Indeed, ‘this hyper-rationalist 
account of behaviour discursively strips Africans of their capacities for political action, 
emancipatory or otherwise’.77 Consequently, the study of the relationship between ideology 
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and interests, through the typical African medium of political songs, is also a call for further 
de-exoticizing and de-pathologizing African politics. 
 
